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Comments
Street Crime, Interstate Commerce, and the
Federal Docket: The Impact of United States v.
Lopez
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Lopez,' the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 19902 because it
exceeded the constitutional power given to Congress to regulate
the commercial activities of private parties.3 Undoubtedly the
most important decision of the Court's October 1994 Term,
Lopez is significant because it invalidated a federal law under
the Commerce Clause for the first time since 1936. The legal
implications of the decision are uncertain and potentially far-
reaching. The holding in Lopez will either be limited to the area
of federal criminal law, with a message to Congress to exercise
restraint, or it will be used to call into question entire areas of
federal regulation.4 With Lopez, the Court's tradition of defer-
1. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 922(qXl)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The law made it a federal
offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the indi-
vidual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." Id.
3. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). The Com-
merce Clause authorizes Congress "[to regulate Commerce ... among the several
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. There was general agreement across the political spectrum on the scope of
the commerce power. For example, in 1987 during his confirmation hearing, Judge
Bork stated that the Commerce Clause "has been expanded so much it cannot be
cut back." Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 664 (1987). This statement may no longer be true.
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ring to congressional determinations of the limits of the com-
merce power may have come to an end.
Lopez illustrates the tensions and dilemmas that have always
dominated and informed the Court's jurisprudence. Throughout
its history, the Court has settled and then revisited the mean-
ings, principles, and myths of the American Republic. In the
most fundamental sense, the Framers and Ratifiers of the Con-
stitution, by no stretch a unified group,' intended to create a
lasting national government.6 That this goal was achieved by an
expanded commerce power is testament to a flexible document
enlivened by a constitutional interpretation that had continued'
until Lopez.7 There are two divergent views of the process that
led to an expanded conception of the federal commerce power.
For originalists, the process is illegitimate because it did not
adhere to the original, narrow conception of commerce! The
5. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC,
1776-1787 (1969); JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS: CRITICS OF THE
CONSTITUTION, 1781-1788 (1961).
6. Just prior to the signing of the Constitution, Benjamin Franklin delivered,
through James Wilson, these words:
I doubt ... whether any other convention we can obtain may be able to
make a better constitution. For, when you assemble a number of men to have
the advantage of their wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those men all
their prejudices, their passions, their errors of opinion, their local interest, and
their selfish views. From such an assembly can a perfect production be expect-
ed? It therefore astonishes me, sir, to find this system approaching so near to
perfection as it does .... Thus I consent, sir, to this Constitution, because I
expect no better, and because I am not sure that it is not the best.
THE LmNG U.S. CONSTITUTION 14 (Saul K Padover, ed. 1968) (quoting Benjamin
Franklin). Mr. Franklin would probably be "astonished" that the Republic has en-
dured for so long.
7. The relationship between historical developments and constitutional inter-
pretation has long been recognized. Justice Holmes wrote that:
[H]istory is the means by which we measure the power which the past has
had to govern the present in spite of ourselves, so to speak, by imposing tra-
ditions which no longer meet their original end. History sets us free and en-
ables us to make up our minds dispassionately whether the survival which we
are enforcing answers any new purpose when it has ceased to answer the old.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV.
443, 452 (1899). Justice Frankfurter, writing prior to his appointment to the Court,
stated that:
[T]he Constitution of the United States is most significantly not a document
but a stream of history. And the Supreme Court has directed the stream.
Constitutional law, then, is history. But equally true is it that American histo-
ry is constitutional law.
FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND WAITE 2
(1937). Contra Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44
STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1030 (1992) ("A 'living Constitution' is, in a sense, no Constitu-
tion at all."). See also William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54
TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN.
L. REV. 849 (1989).
8. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 120 (1987);
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originalists argue that changes in economic development and
sophistication do not excuse an unconstitutional expansion of
federal power The opposing view accepts the expansion of fed-
eral power as a practical development reflecting national eco-
nomic needs as the nation grew following the Civil War.1" This
"practical" argument has the advantage of responding to the
growing irrelevance of state boundaries within a national and
international economic setting. Both arguments have inadequa-
cies and shortcomings. Questions about the difficulty of deter-
mining "intent" aside, originalism does not answer the question
of why each successive generation must adhere to definitions
that do not admit to modern circumstances. The "practical" ar-
gument, on the other hand, does not posit any limitations on
federal commerce power and belittles the notion of limited gov-
ernment.
This comment argues that United States v. Lopez may have a
limited impact on the current state of federalism and the broad
commerce power and merely represents an attempt by the
Rehnquist Court to address the "crisis"" facing the federal
courts as Congress has continued to expand the reach of federal
criminal law. With Lopez, the federal judiciary has attempted to
influence the size and nature of its docket by leaving petty crim-
inal activity to state court adjudication.12 The tone of the ma-
Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387,
1388 (1987). Contra Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understand-
ing, 60 B.U. L. REv. 204 (1980).
9. See BERGER, supra note 8, at 150 ("Economic developments do not confer
power that was withheld."). Professor Epstein argued that "[t]here has been no basic
transformation of the economy that requires, or allows, a parallel transformation in
the scope of the commerce clause. International trade is driven by the principle of
comparative advantage and the costs of reaching distant markets. It did not begin
with either the steamship or the railroad." Epstein, supra note 8, at 1397.
10. See, e.g., E. PARMALEE PRENTICE & JOHN G. EGAN, THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 35 (1898):
The construction of the commerce clause cannot be limited to the accomplish-
ment of the particular objects which the framers of the Constitution sought,
but must broaden with the extending needs of commerce, so as to accomplish
wider purposes. The words of the Constitution still remain, and the purpose to
protect national and international commerce from burdensome, conflicting or
discriminating State legislation still remains; but the application of the clause
to particular conditions is changed. In the course of time, and in greater or
lesser degree, such must be the result of the interpretation of any written
Constitution.
Id.
11. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 6 (1990).
12. But see Judith S. Kaye, Federalism Gone Wild, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1994,
at A29 (calling for an understanding of how criminal cases were burdening state
courts and noting that an invigorated federalism was "no solution at all").
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jority and concurring opinions indicates that the Justices do not
wish to return, as a practical matter, to the original conception
of commerce adhered to by the Framers, a notion the dissenting
opinions reinforce. Section I discusses the various opinions of
Lopez. Section II provides an overview of the commerce clause
jurisprudence and examines the competing interpretations of
this long line of cases. Section III explores some of the concepts
that define the relationship between the states and the federal
government, with emphasis on how Lopez may contribute to
recent attempts to reform the business of the federal courts.
SECTION I. THE LOPEZ OPINION
Alfonso Lopez, Jr. was convicted under the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990 (the "Act") for carrying a handgun and ammu-
nition while attending Edison High School in San Antonio, Tex-
as.1 The conviction was overturned on appeal to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which found that
the Act was beyond congressional commerce power. 4
The Supreme Court's analysis began with a discussion of
several fundamental principles of American Government. The
Court noted that the Constitution created a federal government
of enumerated powers, a system which balances power between
the national government and the states."5 The Court cited Gib-
bons v. Ogden as the first case to define the scope of federal
power under the Commerce Clause. The Court asserted that for
most of the nineteenth century, its decisions concerned limits on
the power of states to burden interstate commerce. 7 The Court
traced the beginning of federal regulatory activity to the passage
13. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626. Lopez was also charged under a Texas law
prohibiting firearm possession on school grounds, but that charge was dismissed
when federal agents intervened. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 46.03(a)(1) (Supp. 1994).
14. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1993), affd, 115 S.
Ct. 1624 (1995).
15. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). THE FEDERALIST No. 45 states:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government
are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are
numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external
objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the
power of taxation will, for the most part, be connected. The powers reserved
to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and
the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
17. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
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of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887'" and the Sherman An-
titrust Act of 1890,19 laws which quickly and decisively affected
Supreme Court jurisprudence." In the decisions that followed,
the Court identified two divergent strands, one prohibiting fed-
eral regulation of local matters such as manufacturing and the
other allowing federal regulation of intrastate matters that were
intermingled with interstate matters.21
The Court argued that, beginning with NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp.,22 formal distinctions among economic ac-
tivities were abandoned and that a "substantial economic ef-
fects" test was developed.23 The result was a greatly expanded
power to regulate commerce.' 4 However, the Court maintained
that the New Deal decisions nonetheless recognized limits to the
federal commerce power by requiring a showing of substantial
economic effect.2"
In an attempt to reconcile its holding with precedent, the
Court identified three types of activities that Congress was au-
thorized to regulate." First, the Court noted that Congress
could regulate the channels of interstate commerce.27 Second,
the Court asserted that Congress could regulate the instrumen-
18. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
19. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
20. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
21. Id. The Court cited Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) and
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) as examples of decisions pro-
hibiting federal regulation of local matters. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627. On the inter-
mingling of intrastate and interstate matters, the Court cited the Shreveport Rate
Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1627.
22. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628 (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125
(1942)).
24. The Court rationalized this expanded congressional authority:
In part, this was a recognition of the great changes that had occurred in the
way business was carried on in this country. Enterprises that had once been
local or at most regional in nature had become national in scope. But the
doctrinal change also reflected a view that earlier Commerce Clause cases
artificially had constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate
commerce.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628.
25. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942), United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)). The Court noted that its standard of review in de-
termining the scope of the commerce power was "whether a rational basis existed for
concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce." Id. at
1629.
26. Id. at 1629.
27. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964)).
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talities of interstate commerce and the persons and things in-
volved in interstate commerce.28 Third, the Court maintained
that the commerce power extended to those activities with a
substantial relation to interstate commerce or that substantially
affect interstate commerce. 9 The Court concluded that the
third category was unclear because it ascribed no limits to the
commerce power, and therefore Congress must demonstrate that
a regulated activity "substantially affected" interstate com-
merce.
30
The Court found that the Gun-Free School Zones Act was
distinguishable from the other cases within the third category
because the activity was not part of a commercial transaction."1
In addition, the Court found that the Act lacked a jurisdictional
element limiting its application to those instances of gun pos-
session affecting interstate commerce.32 After noting that the
record contained no legislative findings establishing a link be-
tween gun possession in schools and interstate commerce,33 the
Court rejected the Government's attempt to show that gun pos-
session actually burdened interstate commerce.' The Court
found that the argument admitted no limits to the commerce
power." The Court characterized the Act as an unconstitutional
expansion of the commerce power that obliterated the distinction
between national matters and local matters.38
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize his
28. Id. (citing The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 243 (1914)).
29. Id at 1629-30 (citing Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 37 and Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968)).
30. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630. The Court held: "We conclude, consistent with
the great weight of our case law, that the proper test requires an analysis of wheth-
er the regulated activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." Id.
31. Id. at 1630-31 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc.,
452 U.S. 264 (1981), Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
32. Id. at 1631. The Court asserted that a "jurisdictional element would en-
sure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects
interstate commerce." Id.
33. The Court noted that under rational basis review, specific legislative find-
ings were not necessary: "We agree with the Government that Congress normally is
not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens that an activity
has on interstate commerce." Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
34. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
35. Id. at 1632. The Court stated that "it [was] difficult to perceive any lim-
itation on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or edu-
cation where States historically have been sovereign." Id.
36. Id. at 1633-34. The Court concluded: "To uphold the Government's conten-
tions here, we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would
bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States." Id. at 1634.
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view that the majority opinion was limited and did not affect the
Court's previous interpretations of the scope of the federal com-
merce power.37 Justice Kennedy's analysis noted that the
Court's jurisprudence was molded in response to nineteenth
century industrialization, initially distinguishing manufacturing
from commerce before abandoning such formal distinctions."
Justice Kennedy argued that while these formal distinctions
were initially resuscitated in response to New Deal legisla-
tion, 9 a more practical view of the commerce power pre-
vailed."' Justice Kennedy maintained that the New Deal cases
and subsequent decisions, in which deference was given to Con-
gress to enact legislation regulating a broad range of commercial
activity, were not being questioned by the majority opinion."
For Justice Kennedy, the concept of stare decisis counseled re-
straint. 2 Yet, Justice Kennedy believed that not all congres-
37. Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined. Id. Justice
Kennedy began with a note of caution:
The history of the judicial struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause during
the transformation from the economic system the Founders knew to the single,
national market still emergent in our own era counsels great restraint before
the Court determines that the Clause is insufficient to support an exercise of
the national power.
Id.
38. Id. at 1635. For cases using such formalistic dichotomies, see Adair v.
United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), The Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463
(1908) and United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). For cases disavow-
ing the earlier approach, see Texas & N.O. R.R. v. Brotherhood of Railway &
Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930) and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. 1 (1911).
39. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poul-
try Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton
R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
40. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1636 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937)). Justice Kennedy remarked that Jones & Laughlin "seem[ed] to
mark the Court's definitive commitment to the practical conception of the commerce
power." Id.
41. Id. at 1637 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971),
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) and United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941)). For Justice Kennedy, these decisions were
"within the fair ambit of the Court's practical conception of commercial regulation
and are not called in question by our decision today." Id.
42. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote:
[T]he Court as an institution and the legal system as a whole have an im-
mense stake in the stability of our Commerce Clause jurisprudence as it has
evolved to this point. Stare decisis operates with great force in counseling us
not to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting the
congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature. That
fundamental restraint on our power forecloses us from reverting to an under-
standing of commerce that would serve only an 18th-century economy, depen-
dent then upon production and trading practices that had changed little over
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sional actions were beyond review, especially if such actions
upset the federal balance."
After noting that federalism was the Founders' unique contri-
bution to political science, Justice Kennedy emphasized the diffi-
culties inherent in a judicial determination of the federal bal-
ance." Justice Kennedy admitted that while one could conclude
that the nature of the balance between state and national power
was best left to political processes, the inexactness of this bal-
ance required judicial intervention.' Justice Kennedy agreed
with the majority opinion that the Act expanded the commerce
power and went beyond the principles of federalism because it
regulated an activity unrelated to interstate commerce and usu-
ally considered to be within the powers of the states."
In a confident concurring opinion peppered with jabs at his
colleagues, Justice Thomas called for the repudiation of much of
the Court's commerce clause jurisprudence, arguing that it had
strayed from the original understanding of the Clause.47 Justice
Thomas examined the text, structure, and history of the Clause
and concluded that the Ratifiers of the Constitution would not
recognize the current understanding. Justice Thomas stressed
the limited definition of "commerce," which- included buying,
selling and transporting goods and did not refer to productive
activities such as manufacturing and agriculture." Justice
Thomas argued that the "substantial effects" test ignored the
text of the Clause, which did not grant Congress the power to
regulate everything that "affected" interstate commerce; to the
contrary, the power to regulate was limited to actual interstate
commerce.
49
the preceding centuries; it also mandates against returning to the time when
congressional authority to regulate undoubted commercial activities was limited
by a judicial determination that those matters had an insufficient connection
to an interstate system. Congress can regulate in the commercial sphere on




44. Id. at 1639.
45. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1639. Justice Kennedy maintained that "the federal
balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays too vital a
role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or the other
level of Government has tipped the scales too far." Id.
46. Id. at 1641.
47. Id. at 1642 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas' argument echoes the
interpretations of Professors Berger and Epstein, but he did not cite the scholarship
of either. See BERGER, supra note 8; Epstein, supra note 8.
48. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1643 (Thomas, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 1644.
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Justice Thomas asserted that constitutional structure indicat-
ed that the Ratifiers had a limited view of the commerce power
because the other enumerated powers in Section 8 of Article I of
the Constitution were stated separately even though these pow-
ers deal with activities that certainly "substantially affect" com-
merce. o Justice Thomas argued that the current broad reading
of the commerce power rendered the other enumerated powers
superfluous, a view which he considered to be illogical and incor-
rect.51
Justice Thomas included an overview of the historical proceed-
ings that supported his interpretation of the proper scope of the
commerce power." For Justice Thomas, those who participated
in the ratification process had an understanding of commerce
that limited federal power to a narrow range of activities while
preserving everything else for "exclusive control" by the
states.53 Justice Thomas maintained that the original under-
standing did not grant the central government power to regulate
all that substantially affected commerce.54 In his review of case
law, Justice Thomas characterized the New Deal cases as a
"wrong turn" that had led the Court to implicitly grant plenary
police powers to the federal government.5 Calling for the refor-
mulation of the "substantial effects" test, Justice Thomas con-
cluded that the Court had wrongly interpreted the Constitu-
tion.5"
The dissenting opinions of Justices Stevens,57 Souter 5 and
Breyer59 all characterized the majority opinion as a departure
from the Court's long-standing interpretation of the commerce
power. The dissenters were united in their view that the majori-
50. Id. For example, Justice Thomas noted that the power to enact bankruptcy
laws could also be inferred from the expanded Commerce Clause. Id. (citing U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 4).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1645.
53. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1645.
54. Id. at 1646.
55. Id. at 1649.
56. Id. at 1650. In the end, even Justice Thomas understood that his icono-
clastic analysis did not befit contemporary commercial relationships:
Although I might be willing to return to the original understanding, I recog-
nize that many believe that it is too late in the day to undertake a funda-
mental reexamination of the past 60 years. Consideration of stare decisis and
reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean.
Id.
57. Id. at 1651 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1651 (Souter, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was joined by Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg. Id.
1995
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ty had engaged in an unwarranted type of judicial activism
while in the process of altering the standard of review in cases
involving congressional regulation of commerce. 0
Justice Souter argued that in resurrecting the commer-
cial/non-commercial dichotomy, the majority opinion had dis-
posed of the Court's traditional rationality review, first by ask-
ing whether the law at issue infringed on traditional state sub-
jects and then by requiring that the law at issue be supported by
explicit legislative findings.6 ' Justice Souter believed that such
an inquiry was incompatible with rational basis review, indicat-
ing a willingness on the part of the majority to return to the
intrusive judicial review that characterized the Court's jurispru-
dence prior to 1937.62 Justice Souter maintained that inquiry
concerning areas of traditional state regulation untenably im-
60. Justice Souter stated:
The modern respect for the competence and primacy of Congress in matters
affecting commerce developed only after one of this Court's most chastening
experiences, when it perforce repudiated an earlier and untenably expansive
conception of judicial review in derogation of congressional commerce pow-
er. . . . [T]oday's decision tugs the Court off course, leading it to suggest op-
portunities for further developments that would be at odds with the rule of re-
straint to which the Court still wisely states adherence.
Id. at 1652 (Souter, J., dissenting). Given the tone of Justice Thomas' concurring
opinion, Justice Souter's dissent seems aimed at circumscribing the possible impact
of the majority opinion. As Justice Frankfurter had earlier observed, "[the scope of
a Supreme Court decision is not infrequently revealed by the candor of the dis-
sent. . . . [I]n constitutional law, a particular decision, howsoever limited to its im-
mediate facts, is not an isolated instance but is apt to serve as the beginning of a
doctrinal process." FRANKFuRTER, supra note 7, at 107.
61. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1653-54.
62. Id. Justice Souter cited West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), as inaugurat-
ing "sea changes" in Supreme Court jurisprudence that repudiated prior judicial
intrusions into legislative power at both the state and federal levels. For cases inval-
idating state regulatory laws, see Louis K Liggett Co. v. Badridge, 278 U.S. 105
(1928), Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) and Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905). For cases invalidating federal regulatory laws see Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936), A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935), Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). Justice
Souter argued that these cases hinged on an impractical, overly formalistic view of
the nature of commerce, a view long discredited:
Thus, under commerce, as under due process, adoption of rational basis review
expressed the recognition that the Court had no sustainable basis for subject-
ing economic regulation as such to judicial policy judgments, and for the past
half-century the Court has no more turned back in the direction of formalistic
Commerce Clause review (as in deciding whether regulation of commerce was
sufficiently direct) than it has inclined toward reasserting the substantive au-
thority of Lochner due process (as in the inflated protection of contractual
autonomy).
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1653.
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plied a weaker commerce power, while the requirement of legis-
lative findings implied that the Court would again examine
legislative policy judgments."
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer found three basic
principles underlying the Commerce Clause: first, the commerce
power reached local activities with significant effects on inter-
state commerce; second, the effect of individual actions must be
viewed in the aggregate; and third, the Court's inquiry must
defer to legislative judgments on the connection between the
regulated activity and interstate commerce." Justice Breyer
was satisfied that these principles required the validation of the
Gun-Free School Zones Act because Congress could rationally
find that even though gun possession could have been an inher-
ently local activity with no commercial aspect, violence in school
zones affected the quality of education and negatively impacted
interstate commerce."6 Thus, while the majority viewed the Act
as outside the commerce power, Justice Breyer argued that
holding that the Act was constitutional was not an expansion of
the commerce power, but merely an application of precedent."'
Even with its isolated holding, Lopez may radically alter the
practice of federal criminal law. Prosecutors and defense attor-
neys will again debate the nexus between federal criminal law
and interstate commerce. But Congress is still able to regulate
local activities as long as they are sufficiently "economic." None-
theless, Lopez could represent great possibilities for reordering
the relationship between the states and the federal government,
especially given the tone of Justice Thomas' concurrence. The
elections of 1996 could usher in a "constitutional moment" ne-
gating the New Deal's administrative state. 7
The Chief Justice was correct in noting that "legal uncertain-
ties" are central to the constitutional inquiry, but he failed to
63. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1654-57. Justice Souter argued that the majority had
used a "hard" case to change the standard of review: "[Wlhile the ease of review
may vary from case to case, it does not follow that the standard of review should
vary, much less that explicit findings of fact would even directly address the stan-
dard." Id. at 1656.
64. Id. at 1657-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 1659. Justice Breyer recounted the evidence of mounting school
violence and its impact on educational quality and included an extensive appendix of
materials on the subject. See id. at 1665.
66. Id. at 1662. Justice Breyer wrote: "In sum, a holding that the particular
statute before us falls within the commerce power would not expand the scope of
that Clause. Rather, it simply would apply preexisting law to changing circumstanc-
es." Id.
67. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) (arguing
that there were three "constitutional moments" in American history: the founding,
the outcome of the Civil War, and the New Deal).
1995
Duquesne Law Review
provide any guidance to judges who will be forced to decipher
the difference between substantial and insubstantial effects.68
There can be no doubt that litigation based on federalism claims
will increase. More specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not
adequately explain why education was not an economic activity
or why gun possession lacked a commercial element. It is quite
easy to envision an interstate network trafficking in weapons
that could have a significant effect on commerce, though demon-
strating that effect might be impossible. By failing to acknowl-
edge the impact that education has on interstate commerce, the
Chief Justice's critique of the dissent remains unconvincing.
Upholding the law at issue here certainly does not expand the
commerce power. The Court avoided overruling precedent but
did not apply it. It stated that the rational basis test applied to
the law at issue but proceeded to heighten the standard.
The tone of Justice Thomas' concurrence indicates what is at
stake. Though no other Justice joined him, Justice Thomas was
willing to radically reorder long-settled practices. The raw judi-
cial power advocated in Lopez could be used to invalidate the
enactments of Congress, ostensibly expressions of the will of the
people, in a wide range of areas. Justice Thomas showed little
regard for the possibilities for social upheaval that would result
if his vision swayed the Court. The following section details the
line of cases and types of issues that led the Court to its holding
in Lopez.
SECTION II. A HISTORY OF COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A response to one of the main shortcomings of the Articles of
Confederation, the Commerce Clause prevented the states from
enacting discriminatory legislation that hobbled trade between
citizens of different states. 9 The rather limited early concep-
tion" has been expanded, granting the federal government a
68. The Rehnquist Court has been unwilling to forward explicit judicial tests.
See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) (providing an inexact judicial
test for determining when regulatory takings require compensation). See also Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1993) (noting that takings
cases involved "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries").
69. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton):
[Tihere are other[] [defects] of not less importance which concur in rendering
[the present federal system] altogether unfit for the administration of the
affairs of the Union. The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all
parties allowed to be of the number .... It is indeed evident . . . that there
is no object, either as it respects the interest of trade or finance, that more
strongly demands a federal superintendence.
THE FEDERALIST, No. 22, at 143-44 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
70. Any discussion of this early conception cannot disregard the impact slavery
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greater role in regulating and prohibiting commercial activity.
On the grandest constitutional scale, what is being disputed
today is the meaning of Gibbons v. Ogden7 and the impact and
efficacy of federal economic regulation, questions which ulti-
mately focus on the New Deal jurisprudence that approved of
congressional enactments regulating virtually every area of
human endeavor.
Chief Justice Marshall and the Commerce Power
As every student of constitutional law knows, John Marshall,
the fourth Chief Justice,7 2 helped shape the fundamental inter-
pretation of the Constitution with such seminal decisions as
Marbury v. Madison,v" Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,74  and
McCulloch v. Maryland.7" More central to our present purposes
are the decisions in Gibbons v. Ogden and Willson v. Black Bird
Creek Marsh Co.," which established the framework for inter-
preting the scope of the commerce power. What these Commerce
Clause decisions share with the earlier cases is an emphasis on
national power and the supremacy of federal law over state
law.
77
had on commerce clause jurisprudence prior to the Civil War. One activity that
southern states did not want the federal government interfering with was slavery. In
addition, early American jurisprudence retreated into positivistic interpretations,
thereby avoiding the moral implications of decisions upholding the legality of slavery.
See BERNARD SCHWARTZ, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 81-82, 159-
60 (1993).
71. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
72. Chief Justice Marshall served from 1801 until 1835. For more detailed in-
formation on Chief Justice Marshall, see CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY (1923) and ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MAR-
SHALL, 4 vols. (1916).
73. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the concept of judicial review of
Acts of Congress). It was here that the Chief Justice stated: "It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is...." Marbury,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
74. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (establishing federal judicial review of state
court decisions interpreting federal law). See also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821) (extending Martin to state court decisions in criminal proceedings
which involved federal questions).
75. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (giving a broad reading to the Necessary
and Proper Clause). The Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress "to make
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the forego-
ing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 19.
76. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
77. Consider G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE, 1815-1835 486 (1991) ("The 'nationalism' inherent in those decisions was
not a nationalism in the modern sense of support for affirmative plenary federal reg-
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The language of the Commerce Clause includes three con-
cepts: the scope of activity (i.e., what is "commerce"?), the type of
power (i.e., what does "regulate" mean?), and the location of the
activity (i.e., what does "among the States" imply?). The scope of
activity within the commerce power hinges on the definition of
commerce, which originally referred to the buying, selling, and
shipping of goods and did not include such distinct activities as
manufacturing and agriculture. Whether persons engaged in or
using the instrumentalities of interstate commerce fell under the
commerce power was an open question with implications for the
slave trade. The type of power hinges on whether it is limited to
mere "regulation," or includes "prohibition," which implicates the
concept of police powers. The location of the activity implies that
there are commercial activities that occur completely within a
state which the commerce power cannot reach. This concept is,
of course, dependent on the definition of commerce, which in its
most limited sense, places many economic activities beyond the
reach of federal interference. Chief Justice Marshall initially
defined these terms in Gibbons. While Gibbons and the other
early decisions focused on what the states could and could not do
vis a vis commerce and not specifically on the nature of federal
legislative power to regulate interstate commerce, the early
discussions had lasting implications for the post-Civil War ex-
pansion of social and economic regulation.
In Gibbons, the Court settled the question of whether the
regulation of navigation between two states was contemplated to
be within the commerce power.7" After establishing that com-
merce included trade and the traffic necessary to accomplish the
buying and selling of goods, the Court held that the federal gov-
ernment was limited to regulating those transactions that oc-
curred between states and had no power to reach into the inter-
nal affairs of the states.79 Likewise, the Court recognized that
ulatory power; the Court's posture can more accurately be described as a critique of
reserved state sovereignty.").
78. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189-90. The Court held: "Commerce, un-
doubtedly, is traffic, but is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the com-
mercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is
regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse." Id. At issue was a
state law granting a monopoly to a steamship company to operate between two
states. Id. at 3-6. A second steamship company, which had a federal coasting license,
wished to operate between the same two points. Id. After holding that the federal
license was impaired by state law, the Court hesitated to limit state action in the
absence of federal action, what is now referred to as the "dormant' commerce power,
but it did conclude that state authority was limited when it contradicted federal law.
Id. at 209-10.
79. Id. at 194. The Court held that the commerce power "is the power to
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states were also limited in regulating interstate commerce."0
However, the Court was equivocal on the issue of whether the
federal commerce power was exclusive, thereby constraining
states from acting even in the absence of federal law on a partic-
ular subject.8" Chief Justice Marshall's opinion embodied an
appreciation for the federal relationship between the national
government and the states, while recognizing the need for na-
tional authority to foster economic growth and interdepen-
dence. 2
The Court seemed to take a step back from Gibbons' exclusiv-
ity dictum in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., in which
it upheld a state law authorizing the construction of a dam
across a navigable waterway, thus impairing a federal coasting
license, the same type of license at issue in Gibbons.' However,
the Court implied that the state law was within the state's po-
lice power to regulate health and safety and did not impinge on
the federal commerce power.85
The Marshall Court set the tone of commerce clause jurispru-
dence by characterizing the commerce power as a negative feder-
al power to prevent state interference with interstate commerce.
Chief Justice Roger Taney, Marshall's successor, focused the
regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This
power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than prescribed in the con-
stitution." Id. at 196. The Court described these limitations:
It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce, which
is completely internal, which is carried on between man and man in a State,
or between different parts of the same State, and which does not extend to or
affect other States. Such a power would be inconvenient, and is certainly un-
necessary.
Id. at 194.
80. Id. at 195. The Court held that the regulatory activity of the states was
restricted to those concerns "which are completely within a particular State, which
do not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the
purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government." Id.
81. Counsel had argued that the power to regulate commerce implied "full
power over the thing to be regulated [and] exclude[d], necessarily, the action of all
others that would perform the same operation on the same thing." Gibbons, 22 U.S.
at 209. While the Court stated that this argument had not been refuted, it did not
commit itself to the position. Id.
82. Chief Justice Marshall also believed that the judiciary should defer to the
will of the people, as expressed in the enactments of Congress: "The wisdom and
discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their
constituents possess at elections, are . . . the sole restraints on which they have
relied, to secure them from its abuse." Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197.
83. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
84. Willson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 246.
85. Id. at 252. The Court found that the state law was not "repugnant to the
power to regulate commerce in its dormant state or . .. in conflict with any law
passed on the subject." Id.
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Court's understanding of the commerce power as a check against
discriminatory assertions of state power.86 For example, in Coo-
ley v. Board of Wardens,7 the Court clarified the exclusivity
doctrine by establishing that some subjects were of such a local
nature that the states could exercise a concurrent power over
interstate commerce.88 Coupled with Willson's police power lim-
itation, Chief Justice Marshall's exclusivity dictum had thus
been refined.89
These early pronouncements established the limits of state
power in areas affecting interstate commerce. In addition, by
defining "commerce" and making distinctions between national
and local matters, whether "interstate" or not, the early cases
affected how the Court analyzed assertions of affirmative federal
power to regulate interstate commerce. A change in the Court's
approach to the commerce power did not come until the last
decade of the nineteenth century, as the Court responded to
congressional enactments such as the Interstate Commerce Act
and the Sherman Antitrust Act.
86. Chief Justice Taney served from 1835 to 1864. See Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 568 (1852) (upholding exclusive state regulation of internal commerce);
The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (voiding state laws imposing a
head tax on passengers arriving in state ports, but also holding that people were ob-
jects of commerce); The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) (sustaining state
laws requiring licenses to distribute intoxicating beverages as within states' police
powers).
87. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
88. Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 320.
89. Implicit in all the discussions of exclusivity was the issue of slavery. See
GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUIONAL LAW 269 (2d ed. 1991). Southern states
did not want slaves to be considered objects of interstate commerce because they
would be within the exclusive domain of the federal commerce power. Id. Then the
states could not regulate the buying and selling of human beings. Id. This strategy
became more important as the mid-century mark approached. Id. Early in the centu-
ry, southern states were able to control how the issue of slavery was raised in na-
tional politics due to their relatively large numbers. Id. Later, as their power was
diluted by the admission of free states, southern states came to rely on the notion
of local control to keep slavery from national encroachment. Id. The strategy of the
abolitionists was a mirror image of the slave state approach. Id. Initially, aboli-
tionists favored a state-by-state approach, which guaranteed that some states would
be free to outlaw slavery. Id. As more free states were admitted to the union, aboli-
tionists began to seek national solutions to slavery. Id. This approach was, of course,
cut off in Chief Justice Taney's most notorious decision, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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The Authority of Congress to Regulate Commerce and the Rise of
Laissez Faire Jurisprudence
The end of slavery and the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment greatly impacted the concept of the federal commerce pow-
er." In the period between the end of the Civil War and the
turn of the century, the economy of the United States was trans-
formed by industrialization and technological innovation. The
progressive politics of the era, with its suspicion of trusts and
monopolies, led Congress to enact legislation insuring that com-
petition was not waylaid by the monopolistic practices used in
some industries. These enactments clashed with the Court's
laissez-faire jurisprudence, which viewed economic regulation as
an impairment of contract rights.9 During the period leading
up to the sea change of 1937, the Court followed contradictory
impulses, invalidating federal laws in some cases by making dis-
tinctions between commerce and manufacturing and upholding
federal laws in other cases by intimating that a "stream of com-
merce" existed that brought into the federal regulatory domain
areas previously thought to have been under exclusive state
control.
After few contributions during the Chief Justiceships of Samu-
el Chase92 and Morrison Waite," the Court gave new meaning
to its commerce clause jurisprudence. After 1890, the Court
considered congressional actions that attempted to influence
economic policy, such as the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
and the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890.94
90. See STONE ET AL., supra note 89, at 151.
91. The judicial activism of this era is epitomized by Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45 (1905), which invalidated a state law limiting the weekly hours of bak-
ery workers. Judicial restraint, on the other hand, is characterized by a deference to
legislative judgment of constitutionality, a refusal to deprive legislatures of a choice
of policy, and a belief that the economic aspects of legislative policy is a function of
fact. See FRANKFURTER, supra note 7, at 81-82. But see Richard Epstein, Self-Interest
and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153, 157 (1987) (arguing that Lochner was
correctly decided because it invalidated special interest legislation).
92. Chief Justice Chaseoserved from 1864 to 1873. See The License Tax Cases,
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462 (1867) (holding that Congress cannot regulate purely intrastate
activities); United States v. De Witt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870) (invalidating, for
the first time, a federal law regulating petroleum products as exceeding the com-
merce power because the law impinged on the police power reserved to the states).
93. Chief Justice Waite served from 1874 to 1887. See Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113 (1877) (upholding state regulation of railroad rates because railroads are
private property devoted to public purposes). According to Professor Frankfurter, this
case "laid the foundation of Congressional entry into fields of comprehensive regu-
lation of economic enterprise." FRANKFURTER, supra note 7, at 83. See, e.g., The
Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
94. These initial regulatory laws, broad and vague in scope, were designed to
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The first consideration of the Sherman Antitrust Act was in
United States v. E.C. Knight Co.5 In E.C. Knight, a New Jersey
corporation had acquired four Pennsylvania corporations that
owned sugar refineries, effectively monopolizing the manufac-
ture of sugar in the United States." While the Court made it
abundantly clear that manufacturing was a sphere of industry
not contemplated to be within the commerce power, 7 it failed
to explain how the purchase of the stock of the companies own-
ing the refineries was not "commerce."
The Court limited federal attempts to prohibit the interstate
shipment of goods manufactured by companies using child labor
in Hammer v. Dagenhart." The Court held that, as a jurisdic-
tional matter, labor regulation was the province of the states,
pursuant to their police powers.99 The Court thus limited the
scope of the congressional power to legislate in the name of
morality.
Initially, the Court adhered to a limited definition of com-
merce which exempted wide areas of economic activity from
federal regulation. In addition, the Court maintained its tradi-
tional approach to areas within the police powers of the states.
However, the Court eventually recognized a greater scope for
congressional action under the commerce power in other con-
texts.
address the excesses of capitalism by promoting competitive practices. See Epstein,
supra note 8, at 1413; JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION 366-70
(1980). Professor Epstein accepts such regulation because it aims to bolster competi-
tion. His complaint generally concerns laws that distort markets without, in even
the slightest way, actually achieving the stated intention of bestowing a benefit on a
narrow class of interests, while extracting costs from a narrow range of parties. See,
e.g., Richard Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK.
L. REV. 741 (1988). What Professor Epstein does not explain is the tension in con-
servative constitutionalism between the principle of majoritarianism and the conser-
vative judicial activism embodied in policy pronouncements on the constitutionality of
legislative acts.
95. 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
96. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17. After purchasing the four Pennsylvania com-
panies, the American Sugar Refining Company refined 98 percent of the sugar in
the United States. Id. at 18 (Harlan, J., dissenting). a
97. Id. at 12. The Court held: "Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not
part of it." Id.
98. 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941).
99. Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276-77. Hammer limited the federal power to pro-
hibit the interstate shipment of goods, approved of in Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S.
321 (1908), "to those things noxious in themselves." Epstein, supra note 8, at 1442.
In the context of railroads, the Court invalidated a federal labor law in The
Employers' Liability Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1908). See also Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (upholding a state minimum wage law).
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Pre-New Deal Expansions of Commerce Power
During the period leading up to the New Deal, the Court also
indicated a willingness to allow certain broad interpretations of
the federal commerce power, especially when the instrumentali-
ties of commerce were involved."°e The Court upheld the feder-
al regulation of activities that were not purely "commercial" and
not purely "interstate" while expanding the notion of "regula-
tion" to include "prohibition."'' Thus, the initial constructs of-
fered in Gibbons were manipulated, usually under the guise of
addressing the interconnectedness of the national economy, and
the groundwork for the New Deal legislation was laid. The
Court sought to reconcile decisions seemingly in conflict with
E.C. Knight by emphasizing that the practices at issue were
aimed at "sales," and not manufacturing."m Nonetheless, sub-
sequent Courts drew on these decisions to justify further expan-
sions of the commerce power. The Court soon disposed of the
difficulties inherent in making artificial distinctions and delin-
eating purely intrastate matters.
100. The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (upholding federal regu-
lation of railroad rates on intrastate routes of interstate carriers). The Court held
that Congress had the power "to control ... all matters having such a close and
substantial relation to interstate traffic." The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at
351. Later, in Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922), the
Court allowed the federal regulation of all railroads, even purely intrastate carriers.
101. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding a federal law pro-
hibiting the shipment of lottery tickets across state lines). "Although the statute in
question operated on articles of interstate commerce, its purpose surely was not to
protect or to facilitate interstate commerce. Quite the opposite-its purpose was de-
signed to influence the primary conduct of individuals...." Epstein, supra note 8,
at 1422. By seeking to prohibit an activity in the name of morality, Congress in-
fringed on the essentially local police power. See also Hoke v. United States, 227
U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the Mann Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1988)), prohibiting the interstate transportation
of women for immoral purposes).
102. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) (upholding regulation
of futures markets as instrumentalities of interstate commerce); Stafford v. Wallace,
258 U.S. 495 (1922) (upholding the regulation of the sales and shipment of beef at
stockyards); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). In Swift, the Court
applied the Sherman Antitrust Act to attempts by meat dealers to create a cartel.
Swift, 196 U.S. at 398. Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, held that
interstate commerce was "not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn
from the course of business." Id. For other cases expanding the commerce power in
the antitrust context, see United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1908) (holding that monopolization of the tobacco industry was within the Sherman
Antitrust Act) and Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (holding
that monopolization of the petroleum industry was within the Sherman Antitrust
Act).
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The New Deal
During the first years of the Roosevelt administration, the
Court invalidated many of the legislative initiatives aimed at
alleviating the effects of the economic crisis.' However, in the
watershed year of 1937, the Court's new majority'"° upheld
both state and federal regulatory laws under the Due Pro-
cess 0 5 and Commerce Clauses."'6 For some commentators, it
was the culmination of a trend toward the recognition of a na-
tional economy,"' while other commentators have viewed this
period as the beginning of the end of federalism.' 0
The "substantial economic effects" test was later expanded in
Wickard v. Filburn,°9 in which the Court upheld a federal law
reaching trivial, "non-commercial" activities. Using a "cumula-
tive effects" theory, the Wickard Court announced that Congress
was able to regulate even those local activities that lacked a di-
rect effect on interstate commerce as long as such activities
substantially affected commerce."0 The Court reasoned that
such activities, when aggregated with the impact of all those
engaging in such activity, had a substantial impact on interstate
commerce."' Wickard represented an unprecedented expansion
103. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (using the E.C.
Knight manufacturing/commerce dichotomy to invalidate a federal law affecting prices
and labor relations in coal mining industry); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. Unit-
ed States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating a federal law regulating wages and
hours of labor in a local business); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S.
330 (1935) (invalidating a federal law creating a retirement and pension system).
For an account of this period written by an attorney who participated in many of
the cases on behalf of the Government, see Robert L. Stem, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645-93, 883-947 (1946).
104. The Court's membership had not changed, but Justice Roberts switched
sides and joined the Carter dissenters, Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Brandeis,
Stone, and Cardozo.
105. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding state
minimum wage law). The Due Process Clause provides: "No state shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... " U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
106. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding
federal law regulating labor practices).
107. See Stern, supra note 103, at 545-47.
108. See Epstein, supra note 8, at 1443. 'The old barriers were stripped away;
in their place has emerged the vast and unwarranted concentration of power in
Congress that remains the hallmark of the modem regulatory state." Id.
109. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
110. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124-25.
111. Id. at 127-28. The Court stated that an individual's effect on interstate
commerce may be trivial, but that fact was not "enough to remove him from the
scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with that
of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial." Id.
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of the commerce power.
While the transformation of the Commerce Clause was com-
plete, there were Justices who continued to recognize that feder-
alism limited the powers of Congress. Justices Cardozo and
Frankfurter were frequent critics of the Court's blurring of the
limits of federalism." In his concurrence in Schechter, Justice
Cardozo argued that there were intrastate activities that re-
mained beyond the commerce power.' In addition, Justice
Frankfurter, an advisor to President Roosevelt prior to his ap-
pointment to the Court, was a proponent of judicial restraint
and federalism."' For Justice Frankfurter, federal criminal
laws that intruded on traditional state authority were inval-
id."' Thus, the seeming carte blanche of Wickard continued to
have its limitations."6
The Court had signalled its deference to congressional actions
that greatly enhanced federal regulatory power, and as a result,
Congress was virtually free to enact whatever initiatives it de-
fined as constitutional. The result has been concomitant strains
112. In 1928, Professor Frankfurter warned that increasing the number of fed-
eral courts would "result[] in a depreciation of the judicial currency and the conse-
quent impairment of the prestige of the federal courts." Felix Frankfurter, Distribu-
tion of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CoRNELL L. Q.
499, 506 (1928).
113. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935)
(Cardozo, J., concurring). Justice Cardozo warned: 'There is a view of causation that
would obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local in the
activities of commerce." Schechter, 295 U.S. at 554.
114. See Louis Henken, Voice of a Modern Federalism, in FELIX FRANKFURTER:
THE JuDGE 68 (Wallace Mendelson ed. 1964); Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix
Frankfurter: The Architect of "Our Federalism", 27 GA. L. REv. 697 (1993);
SCHWARTZ, supra note 70, at 497-506.
115. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 138 (1945) (Roberts, Frankfurt-
er, and Jackson, J.J., dissenting) (arguing that the law at issue was a needless
extension of federal criminal authority into a traditional state area); United States v.
Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953) (plurality opinion) (invalidating federal
reporting requirements on the grounds of reaching purely intrastate transactions).
Justice Frankfurter also dissented in two landmark cases extending federal
jurisdiction. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting) (the Court allowed federal civil rights suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without
exhaustion of state remedies); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting) (disposing of the political question doctrine, the Court held that the
issue of the legality of a legislative apportionment scheme was justiciable).
116. Justice Frankfurter was on the bench when a unanimous Court issued its
opinion in Wickard, authored by Justice Jackson. In addition, Justice Jackson joined
the Five Gambling Devices plurality opinion dismissing the federal indictment, even
though the same "cumulative effects" theory could have been applied to uphold the
reporting requirements for the sales of gambling devices. Without intrastate reports,
it was impossible to trace devices that later traveled in interstate commerce. See
Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited-The Federalization of Intrastate
Crime, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 271, 274-75 (1973).
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on the judicial workload and the relationship between states and
the federal government. While the Wickard Court argued that it
was merely applying Chief Justice Marshall's original conception
of "commerce," 7 it was obvious that something entirely new
had occurred. That the commerce clause jurisprudence remained
settled until Lopez is testament to how far federal power could
reach. But Lopez is not so inexplicable if one considers the as-
cendence of conservative jurisprudence, as exemplified by the
unwavering opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
The Rehnquist Era
Prior to Justice Rehnquist's appointment, the Court rehdered
opinions in two cases touching on issues that would later help
define the Rehnquist era. In Maryland v. Wirtz,"' the Warren
Court held that the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act"' could
be applied to regulate the wages and hours of employees at state
institutions.2 ' Then, the Burger Court obliterated the distinc-
tion between intrastate and interstate crime in United States v.
Perez.21 In Perez, the Court relied on the "class of activities"
test used in the public accommodations cases 2 to uphold a
federal criminal law that required no demonstration of an inter-
state nexus."2 The Perez Court held that it was sufficient that
117. Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, stated: "At the beginning Chief
Justice Marshall described the federal commerce power with a breadth never yet
exceeded." Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120.
118. 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled in part by National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
119. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
120. Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 198-99. In dissent, Justice Douglas argued:
The Court's opinion skillfully brings employees of state-owned enterprises with-
in the reach of the Commerce Clause; and as an exercise in semantics it is
unexceptionable if congressional federalism is the standard. But what is done
here is nonetheless such a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by
the Tenth Amendment that it is in my view not consistent with our constitu-
tional federalism.
Id. at 201 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
121. 402 U.S. 146 (1971). In dissent, Justice Stewart maintained that:
[Tihe Framers of the Constitution never intended that the National Govern-
ment might define as a crime and prosecute such wholly local activity through
the enactment of federal criminal laws .... But it is not enough to say that
loan sharking is a national problem, for all crime is a national problem.
Perez, 402 U.S. at 157 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
122. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
123. To establish federal criminal jurisdiction, prosecutors no longer had to
demonstrate that each specific criminal act affected interstate commerce. See Stern,
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Congress had made extensive findings establishing the inter-
state effect of extortionate credit transactions. 2' The Court did
not require that the Government establish that the particular
actions of the defendant in Perez affected interstate commerce,
but only that the defendant had engaged in the class of activi-
ties contemplated to have been within the federal criminal stat-
ute.us
The themes of state sovereignty and federalism expressed in
the dissenting opinions in Wirtz and Perez were subsequently
picked up by Justice Rehnquist, who authored the Court's opin-
ion overruling Wirtz in part in National League of Cities v.
Usery.1" A decision animated by the notion of state sovereign-
ty,"7 National League of Cities invalidated the 1974 amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act'28 that extended the
wage and hour provisions to state and municipal employees
because they impaired "essentially and peculiarly state pow-
ers."' 9 While noting that the statute was within the scope of
the commerce power, the Court marked off an area that was
exclusively the province of the states, without precluding con-
gressional regulation of wages and hours of other types of em-
ployees.'
In his concurrence in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, '' Justice Rehnquist expressed discomfort
with the practice of deferring to congressional judgment on a
law's connection to interstate commerce." 2 The Justice's nar-
supra note 116, at 273.
124. Perez, 402 U.S. at 154. The interstate element was alleged in congressional
findings, cited by the Court in a footnote. Id. at 147 n.1. It was not alleged that the
defendant was associated with "organized crime."
125. Id. at 154.
126. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
127. The Court reasoned:
One undoubted attribute of state sovereignty is the States' power to determine
the wages which shall be paid to those whom they employ in order to carry
out their governmental functions, what hours those persons will work, and
what compensation will be provided where these employees may be called
upon to work overtime.
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845.
128. Fair Labor Standards Act, Pub. L. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (1974) (current ver-
sion at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
129. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845 (quoting Coyle v. Oklahoma,
221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911)).
130. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-22 (2d ed.
1988): "[R]ather than narrowing the stream of commerce, the Court instead chose to
create islands in that stream-islands where the states alone could regulate, islands
off-limits to the once seemingly omnipresent federal government." Id.
131. 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
132. Justice Rehnquist stated that "simply because Congress may conclude that
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row view of the commerce power required a demonstration of a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. 133
In 1985, National League of Cities was overruled by Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,"4 with Justice
Blackmun joining the National League of Cities dissenters."'
In Garcia, the Court disposed of the "traditional function" test
as unworkable and argued that the states' sovereign authority
was not impaired."' In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Rehnquist predicted that the Court would eventually return to
the principles of National League of Cities."7
The most recent exposition of the limits of federalism occurred
in New York v. United States,"' in which the Court invalidated
the "take title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Policy Amendments Act of 1985.. as a violation of the Tenth
Amendment."4° Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor held
that state sovereignty prevented Congress from forcing states to
participate in federal policy directives.'
a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily
make it so." Hodel, 452 U.S. at 311.
133. Justice Rehnquist maintained that "the commerce power does not reach ac-
tivity which merely 'affects' interstate commerce. There must instead be a showing
that a regulated activity has a substantial effect on that commerce." Id. at 312.
134. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
135. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531. The Court held:
[T]he attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of
"traditional governmental function" is not only unworkable but is also inconsis-
tent with established principles of federalism and, indeed, with those very
federalism principles on which National League of Cities purported to rest.
That case, accordingly, is overruled.
Id. Indeed, the test announced in National League of Cities proved so unworkable
that in the nine years leading to Garcia, the Court never held that a federal law
was inapplicable to the states for impinging on the traditional functions of local
government.
136. Id. at 549.
137. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See also William W. Van Alstyne,
The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1731-33 (1985) (arguing for
a vigorous judicial review enforcing the limits of federalism on legislative power).
138. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
139. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L.
99-240, 99 Stat. 1842, 1850 (repealed). The "take title" provision required that states
dispose of radioactive waste in accordance with federal standards or assume liability.
Id.
140. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 179-80. The Tenth Amendment
states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively; or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
141. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 179-80. See Richard E. Levy, New
York v. United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and
Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 493 (1993)
(arguing that the Court misread precedent in fashioning its broad "no commandeer-
ing" rule). The Court tried to distinguish Garcia because it compelled action by both
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Chief Justice Rehnquist has patiently adhered to a vision of
federalism that was once out of fashion but now commands a
majority of the Court. But the Court remains divided on these
crucial issues. The ideological commitment of the Chief Justice
countenances no opposition. Though he compromised in Lopez in
order to attract the votes of Justices Kennedy and O'Connor,
Chief Justice Rehnquist has little use for stare decisis when it
clashes with his vision of constitutional jurisprudence. In the
end, a principled constitutionalism may be impossible in light of
the ongoing politicization of the judicial decision making process.
SECTION III. AT THE CROSSROADS: COMPROMISE, PRINCIPLE, AND
JUDICIAL ACTISM
In the October 1994 term, the Rehnquist Court, employing a
judicial activism traditionally eschewed by judicial conserva-
tives, was able to forward its agenda of conservative
constitutionalism to a degree only hinted at in previous
terms. 142 On several fronts, usually with 5-4 majorities, the
Court limited federal power, sending strong messages to all
three branches of the federal government."4 In Lopez, the
Court enunciated a potentially sweeping limitation on the power
of Congress to regulate commerce. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
along with allies Justices Scalia and Thomas, saw long-held
beliefs command a majority of the votes of the Court. But in
order to get the fourth and fifth votes, the Chief Justice was
forced to temper his most extreme policy views. To garner the
votes of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, Chief Justice
Rehnquist grudgingly accepted the continued vitality of the New
Deal cases as well as the public accommodations cases, but was
able to change the "rational basis" test by requiring a demon-
states and private parties. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 201 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). New York v. United States has yet to be
used to invalidate a federal law for impinging on state sovereignty.
142. See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH.
L. REv. 641 (1990) (arguing that conservative activism has displaced the liberal-legal
paradigm). Professor West maintained that conservative and progressive theories of
jurisprudence are in agreement "that liberal neutrality in judging is illusory, and
that constitutional adjudication is consequently necessarily political." Id. at 644. To-
day, the dispute "is over the value of the visions of the good defined by the various
hierarchies that make up our private and social life." Id.
143. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (limit-
ing congressional remedies for racial discrimination); Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct.
2038 (1995) (holding that a federal judge had exceeded his power in overseeing a
school desegregation plan); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995) (limiting execu-
tive power under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), to force states to redraw congressional districts).
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stration by Congress of some relationship between the regulated
activity and interstate commerce. While the 104th Congress has
shown signs of reinvigorating the powers of the states, the Court
has acted to nudge the process along. Advocates of federalism
have reason to feel emboldened by the new atmosphere, especial-
ly in the areas of gun control'" and environmental regula-
tion.'" But the disregard for precedent, with implications for
the Court's legitimacy and the potential for social upheaval,
reveals a dilemma for conservative constitutionalists. In the end,
though, Lopez may merely be an expression by the federal judi-
ciary of its special role in the adjudicatory process.
Federalism and the Tenth Amendment
Lopez was one of several decisions made during the October
1994 Term that were favorable to the states.'" In the context
of the commerce power, Lopez is an extension of the Court's
limitation on federal power announced in New York v. United
States. The values of federalism underlying New York v. United
States are reflected in Lopez, with its emphasis on exclusive
spheres of state control. Lopez is on its strongest footing when
viewed as a restatement of the principle of limited government,
with powers reserved to local entities attuned to local problems.
In Lopez, the Rehnquist Court tried to reassert the notions of
state sovereignty and limited federal powers. During his tenure,
Chief Justice Rehnquist has been willing to expand his concep-
tion of federalism at every opportunity.4" But his assumption
144. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 854 F. Supp. 1503 (D. Mont. 1994)
(holding that the Brady law, 18 U.S.C. § 922, violated the Tenth Amendment by
forcing state authorities to enforce federal policy). See Dyan Finguerra, The Tenth
Amendment Shoots Down the Brady Act, 3 J.L. & POLY 637 (1995).
145. The Court upheld the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1544 (1994), in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) (holding that
the Act protected the habitat of endangered animals, as well as the animals them-
selves). Of course, this outcome could be undone by a Congress hostile to environ-
mental regulation.
In the Court's October 1993 Term, environmentalists successfully used the
federalism strategy to prevent the construction of a dam. See PUD No. 1 of Jeffer-
son County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994) (holding that
state regulations were not pre-empted in the absence of conflicting federal regula-
tions).
146. See, e.g., New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995); Anderson v. Green, 115 S. Ct. 1059
(1995); Nebraska v. Loewenstein, 115 S. Ct. 557 (1994) (unanimous decisions allow-
ing state independence in financial matters).
147. See Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Feder-
alism, 91 YALE L.J. 1317, 1360 (1982) (arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist engaged
in judicial activism to invalidate legislation that impinged on state sovereignty).
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that states, being closer to the people, are the guardians of free-
dom is historically inaccurate and ignores the changes in the
federal relationship brought by the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In addition, any redistribution of power within a federal sys-
tem should occur through the legislative process, in which elect-
ed officials reflect the will of the people and are accountable to
the electorate. Lopez invalidated a duly passed law, which indi-
cates that the Court is willing to substitute its judgment about
the role of the federal government for that of the legislature.
Stare Decisis and Judicial Activism
The dangers of disregarding precedent include a loss of legiti-
macy for the Court and a disruption of the balance of powers
within the federal framework." In ending the Lochner era's
activism, the New Deal Court adopted a "rational basis" test for
evaluating congressional enactments under the Commerce
Clause. The test deferred to the intentions of Congress, which
was charged with defining the scope of its power under the
Clause. The Court's decisions in this area thus did not proscribe
action but allowed a broad scope for fashioning legislative re-
sponses. The responsibility of decision making thus rests solely
on elected officials. Lopez, on the other hand, gingerly accepted
New Deal precedents but employed a more stringent evaluation
of whether the regulated activity "substantially affected" inter-
state commerce. Such a change in the test reflects Chief Justice
Rehnquist's impatience with congressional determinations of
constitutionality. In light of the fact that the Court has tradi-
tionally left that determination to Congress, the Chief Justice
was forced to address questions concerning stare decisis. Chief
Justice Rehnquist has never hesitated to advocate overturning
148. Contra Earl M. Maltz, No Rules in a Knife Fight: Chief Justice Rehnquist
and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 669, 677 (1994): "[I]t is both
illogical and unrealistic to expect [Chief Justice Rehnquist] to feel bound by the deci-
sions of other justices when they would not give similar weight to decisions with
which they disagree." Professor Maltz argued that the Chief Justice would have no
qualms overruling the precedents that resulted from the major alterations of law in-
stituted by the New Deal Court and the Warren Court. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist
has implied or explicitly stated that he would vote to overrule such Warren Court
decisions as Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police officers to
advise suspects of certain constitutional rights), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (requiring that an indigent criminal defendant be provided with legal counsel),
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding from state criminal proceedings evi-
dence acquired in unconstitutional searches) and Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167
(1961) (expanding federal jurisdiction in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions), overruled on other
grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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precedent that he considers to have been wrongly decided, even
though in doing so he denigrates the principle of
majoritarianism, an ideal usually embraced by conservative
jurists.
The Court's most recent exposition of the doctrine of stare
decisis came in Planned Parenthood v. Casey."9 In Casey, the
Court adhered to the doctrine for the sake of the Court's legiti-
macy and to avoid social dislocation.5 ° In his dissenting opin-
ion, Chief Justice Rehnquist ridiculed the majority's conception
of stare decisis as a distortion of the doctrine's role.' While
stare decisis once offered many institutional benefits,'52 it is
clear that, from the position of the Chief Justice, the doctrine
has little application when a Justice believes that a constitution-
al case has been wrongly decided." 3
While no cases were explicitly overruled in Lopez, the Court
failed to distinguish several important precedents, especially the
line of cases starting with Wickard v. Filburn that was based on
the aggregation theory. For example, the Court distinguished
United States v. Perez because loansharking affects the channels
of interstate commerce, as Congress made clear in its specific
findings. But the Perez holding, which allowed federal prose-
cution of purely local actions, will have to be overruled if the
Rehnquist Court wishes to revolutionize federal criminal law.
In addition, the concurrence of Justice Thomas indicates that
a strictly originalist position requires a return to eighteenth cen-
tury interpretations of the commerce power. Whatever the ineffi-
ciencies of a federal regulatory scheme may be, an originalist
approach cannot explain the value in dismantling modern Amer-
149. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (invalidating a state law restricting abortion).
150. The Court held that ignoring precedent would do "profound and unneces-
sary damage to the Court's legitimacy." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2816. In addition, the
Court noted that people had come to rely on prior law and had "organized intimate
relationships and made choices that define their views of themselves and their plac-
es in society." Id. at 2809. The Court found that its "power lies . . . in its legitima-
cy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance
of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare
what it demands." Id. at 2814.
151. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice
argued that under the majority's characterization of stare decisis, "when the Court
has ruled on a divisive issue, it is apparently prevented from overruling that deci-
sion for the sole reason that it was incorrect, unless opposition to the original deci-
sion has died away." Id. at 2863.
152. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 724 (1988) (arguing that the doctrine "maintain[s] po-
litical stability and continuity in society.").
153. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17




Federal Criminal Law and the Federal Docket
While it is easy to speculate on some of the broader implica-
tions of Lopez, its most immediate impact will be felt in the area
of federal criminal law. The Lopez decision addresses concerns
that the proliferation of federal criminal statutes has diluted the
special stature of the federal courts, inundating them with mun-
dane criminal proceedings more appropriately adjudicated in
state courts.'" Various reports by federal judicial agencies' 5
as well as articles published by Chief Justice Rehnquist' indi-
cate that Lopez was aimed directly at effecting immediate
change in the makeup of the federal judiciary's docket. But this
seemingly innocuous goal requires the undoing of the entrenched
and oftentimes spasmodic development of federal criminal
law. '5 The electoral process was supposed to safeguard the
limits of federal power.'" However, today few members of Con-
gress would oppose a crime bill for fear of appearing "soft" on
the issue. Therefore, the Lopez Court acted to limit the power of
the legislative branch because Congress has never been able to
154. Many vocal critics of federal criminal jurisprudence are members of the
federal judiciary. Judge Miner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit advocated a limited role for the federal courts in criminal prosecution, espe-
cially crimes without an interstate component. See Roger J. Miner, Crime and Pun-
ishment in the Federal Courts, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 681, 687-88 (1992); Roger J.
Miner, Federal Courts, Federal Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 117, 124 (1987).
155. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, THE CRIMINAL CASE-
LOAD: THE NATURE OF CHANGE (1995) [hereinafter THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD]; COM-
MITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRO-
POSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (1994) [hereinafter PROPOSED
LONG RANGE PLAN]; FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, PLANNING FOR.THE FUTURE: RE-
SULTS OF A 1992 FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF UNITED STATES JUDGES
(1994) [hereinafter 1992 SURVEY OF JUDGES]; WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & RUSSELL R.
WHEELER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRA-
TION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1994) [hereinafter ON FEDERALIZATION]; RE-
PORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 11.
156. See William H. Rehnquist, Seen in a Glass Darkly: The Future of the Fed-
eral Courts, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1 (1993); William H. Rehnquist, Welcoming Remarks:
National Conference on State-Federal Judicial Relationships, 78 VA. L. REV. 1657
(1992) [hereinafter Welcoming Remarks]; William H. Rehnquist, The Changing Role
of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1986).
157. For accounts of the development of federal criminal law, see Sara Sun
Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 775
(1983); Norman Abrams, Federal Criminal Law Enforcement, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND JUSTICE 779 (1983).
158. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824) (Chief Justice
Marshall argued that elections would restrain Congress from abuse of the commerce
power).
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exercise self-restraint in this area."59
Criticisms of the development of federal criminal law are not
new."" And as Congress has continued to enact new criminal
laws, additional calls for reform have been issued.'' Today,
the voices are virtually united in the denunciation of the federal-
ization of intrastate crime.6 2 These critics reinforce the percep-
tions of members of the federal judiciary that a crisis is engulf-
ing the courts, and nothing short of radical re-evaluation of fed-
eral criminal law will suffice. Lopez is thus the first step.
Crime has traditionally been viewed as a local matter within
the police powers of the states. Prior to the Civil War, federal
criminal offenses were few and limited to those activities that
resulted in injury to the federal government or its programs."
During the nineteenth century, clashes between state courts and
the federal government over jurisdictional questions were re-
solved in favor of enlarging the scope of federal jurisdiction."s
After the Civil War, federal criminal laws were enacted that
159. Justice O'Connor opined that Congress had an "underdeveloped capacity for
self-restraint." Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 588 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
160. In 1925, legal historian Charles Warren wrote:
The present congested condition of the dockets of the Federal Courts and the
small prospect of any relief to the heavily burdened Federal Judiciary, so long
as Congress continues, every year, to expand the scope of the body of Federal
crimes, renders it desirable that consideration be given to the possibility of a
return to the practice which was in vogue in the early days of the Federal
judicial system.
Charles Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARv. L. REv. 545,
545 (1925).
161. Robert Stern, who had earlier helped usher in the New Deal as an official
in the Justice Department, remarked in 1973: "[Rlecent developments in the federal-
ization of intrastate crime which appear to extend the commerce power beyond pre-
vious limits raise .important constitutional questions under the commerce clause."
Stern, supra note 116, at 274.
162. See Thomas M. Mengler, The Sad Refrain of Tough on Crime: Some
Thoughts on Saving the Federal Judiciary from the Federalization of State Crime, 43
U. KAN. L. REV. 503 (1995); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New
Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS
L.J. 979 (1995); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief. The Federalization of Ameri-
can Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995).
163. See Beale, supra note 157, at 775-79.
164. See Warren, supra note 160, at 583-98. Professor Warren described three
phases of this process. First, the Court held that states could not be compelled to
enforce federal criminal law in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615
(1842). Second, Congress enacted criminal laws that took jurisdiction away from
state courts. Third, the Court allowed for removal to federal courts of state criminal
proceedings in Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880).
Ironically, it was the holding in Prigg that led to the development of a fed-
eral police force to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. See SCHWARTZ, supra note
70, at 175-76.
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protected private citizens from injury. In Champion v. Ames,165
the Court held that Congress could regulate in the name of
morality, thus creating a federal police power over activity that
had been considered to be exclusively within the states' police
powers.'" The passage of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1918
resulted in a flood of federal prosecutions until the Amendment
was repealed in 1933.' During the New Deal, Congress pro-
vided for criminal and civil penalties in a wide range of social
and economic initiatives."
The next major expansion in federal criminal jurisdiction
came in 1971 when the Court upheld the federal regulation of
an overinclusive class of activities. In United States v. Perez, the
Court upheld a conviction in federal court without an establish-
ment of a nexus between the criminal activity and interstate
commerce." 9 Congress was free to determine the scope of fed-
eral jurisdiction.
Other enactments, such as the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970,170 the Speedy Trial Act of
1974,' and the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,172 radically
changed the nature of the federal docket and placed great
strains on federal judicial resources. 173 Commentators have
165. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
166. The Court upheld federal laws under the commerce power in a variety of
areas. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (upholding a prohibi-
tion on the interstate transportation of stolen vehicles); Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470 (1917) (upholding a prohibition on the interstate transportation of
women for immoral purposes).
167. See Edward Rubin, A Statistical Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 1
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 494 (1934). The Eighteenth Amendment provided: "[T]he
manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors . . . is hereby prohibited."
U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
168. Judge Miner observed that the New Deal decisions initiated 'the most
expansive intervention of the federal government in crime control since the begin-
ning of the Republic." Miner, supra note 154, at 123.
169. United States v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). Stern noted that "[t]he
key to the Perez decision may be found in the difficulty of proving in each individu-
al case that the loan shark had an interstate connection even when it existed."
Stern, supra note 116, at 278.
170. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1988 & Supp. V
1993)).
171. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988)). See George Bridges, The Speedy Trial Act of
1974: Effects on Delays in Federal Criminal Litigation, 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 50 (1982).
172. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, § 211, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 21, 26, 28, 49 U.S.C.). See Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988).
173. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND RE-
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noted the increase in the federal workload, 7 4 while federal
judges have decried the change in the status of federal
courts.'75 Published studies by the Federal Judicial Center also
advocate a re-evaluation of the role of the federal courts.
76
These studies imply that prosecutions for street crimes involving
petty drug transactions do not belong in the federal courts.
17
Lopez will allow the courts to invalidate those enactments under
the commerce power that do not relate to the channels or the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Without this connec-
tion, federal criminal laws that reach purely intrastate conduct
will not be able to pass the "substantial effects" test.
Lopez is the culmination of these trends and represents a
frustration with a Congress unwilling or unable to exercise self-
restraint. Yet, Lopez can also be seen as an unprincipled usurpa-
tion of the legislative process that does nothing to address the
FORM (1985).
174. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, supra note 162, at 983-97 ("[T]he increasing
criminal caseload threatens to impair the quality of the justice meted out in criminal
cases and significantly impairs federal judges' ability to perform their core constitu-
tional functions in civil cases."). See also Mengler, supra note 162, at 533: "Expan-
sion in recent years by Congress and the Executive Branch into areas of criminal
law enforcement that previously were reserved to the states has overwhelmed the
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crisis that engulfs both state and federal court systems.'78 Sys-
temic reform is certainly required to address the "crisis" current-
ly inundating the federal courts. Lopez may serve as merely a
reminder to Congress that its commerce power has "outer lim-
its," but the decision may have broader, more sweeping im-
pact.' Indeed, the continued vitality of the New Deal legisla-
tion may hinge on the outcome of the 1996 elections.
Charles B. Schweitzer
178. The author of this comment concurs with Professor Little, who wrote:
Federal legislative or enforcement polices based on an expansive concept of the
'dignity' of federal courts are unprincipled, founded on unarticulated and dis-
putable premises, and ignore too large a portion of our existing criminal jus-
tice system: talented and struggling state courts. There is an implied elitist
and self-protectionist component of this message that seems entirely illegiti-
mate.
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